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How  does  an individual’s  sex  inﬂuence  their  recall  of  social  relations?  Extensive  research  has  shown  that
social networks  differ  by  sex  and  has  attempted  to explain  these  differences  either  through  structural
availability  or  individual  preferences.  Addressing  the limitations  of  these  explanations,  we  build on  an
increasing  body  of  research  emphasizing  the  role  of  cognition  in the  formation  and maintenance  of
networks  to argue  that males  and  females  may  exhibit  different  strategies  for  encoding  and  recalling
social  information  in  memory.  Further,  because  activating  sex  roles  can  alter  cognitive  performance,  we
propose that  differences  in recall  may  only  or primarily  appear  when  respondents  are  made  aware  ofemory their sex.  We  explore  differences  in male  and  female  network  memory  using  a laboratory  experiment
asking  respondents  to memorize  and  recall  a novel  social  network  after  receiving  either  a  sex  prime  or  a
control  prime.  We  ﬁnd  that  sex signiﬁcantly  impacts  social  network  recall,  however  being  made  aware
of one’s  sex  does  not.  Our  results  provide  evidence  that  differences  in male  and  female  networks  may  be
partly due  to sex-based  differences  in  network  cognition.
ublis©  2015  The  Authors.  P
. Introduction
How does sex inﬂuence the ability to encode and recall social
elations? Males and females have long been known to dif-
er in their network structures (Brashears, 2008a; Ibarra, 1992;
arsden, 1987; Moore, 1990; Smith-Lovin and McPherson, 1993),
ith these differences usually ascribed to structural constraints
e.g., McPherson and Smith-Lovin, 1987; Moore, 1990), disposi-
ions/preferences (e.g., Eder and Hallinan, 1978; Feshbach and
ones, 1971; Ibarra, 1992, 1997), or combinations thereof (e.g.,
rashears, 2008b; McGuire, 2002; Munch et al., 1997). However,
here is growing evidence that social networks depend on the struc-
ure of the brain (e.g., Bickart et al., 2011; Dunbar, 1992, 1993,
995; Goncalves et al., 2011; Meyer et al., 2012; Sallet et al., 2011;
tiller and Dunbar, 2007; Zahn et al., 2007), on cognitive develop-
ent (e.g., Leinhardt, 1973; Schaefer et al., 2010) and on the use
f schemata (e.g., Brashears, 2013; Brewer and Garrett, 2001; De
oto, 1960; Freeman, 1992; Killworth and Bernard, 1982). Thus, do
ale and female networks vary because men  and women encode
nd recall those networks differently?
If males and females encode and recall networks differently,
hen variations in network structure, net of constraints, may  not
∗ Corresponding author at: Department of Sociology, University of South Carolina,
loan College, Room 321, 911 Pickens Street, Columbia, SC 29208, United States.
E-mail address: Meb299@cornell.edu (M.E. Brashears).
ttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.socnet.2015.06.002
378-8733/© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article 
/).hed  by  Elsevier  B.V. This  is  an  open  access  article  under  the  CC  BY-NC-ND
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
reﬂect differences in preferences, but instead simply result from
differences in cognition. Moreover existing research on situational
cognition (e.g., LaFrance et al., 2003; Lightdale and Prentice, 1994;
Spencer et al., 1999) demonstrates that some sex differences in
cognitive performance and behavior are only evident when con-
text makes one’s sex salient. Sex is a master status and therefore
relevant to a wide variety of circumstances (Ridgeway and Correll,
2004; Ridgeway and Smith-Lovin, 1999), suggesting that it is often
activated in the interactions that give rise to social networks. Yet
existing research has not primed or activated sex and is thus unable
to detect such effects if they do exist.
We  use a randomized laboratory experiment to explore how
sex and sex role activation, impact the encoding and recall of
a novel social network. We ﬁnd that females exhibit noticeably
superior network recall relative to males, and that this advantage
does not appear to depend on differential skill with “compression
heuristics,” which are useful for simplifying social networks, on
personality differences, or on variation in cognitive ﬂexibility, and
exhibits no interaction with sex role salience.
2. Background
2.1. Networks and gender differencesThe social networks of men are different from those of women.
Female networks are often larger than male networks (e.g., Moore,
1990) and include a higher proportion of kin (Marsden, 1987),
under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.
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lthough this tendency may  be weakening over time (McPherson
t al., 2006, 2008; But see also Fischer, 2009; McPherson et al.,
009). While males and females predominantly associate with sim-
lar others (Marsden, 1988; McPherson et al., 2001), males make
ewer distinctions between alters on the basis of religion, and more
n the basis of age, than females (Brashears, 2008a). Sex also helps
etermine whether individuals name their spouses as discussion
artners (Liao and Stevens, 1994) and inﬂuences the topics of dis-
ussion that arise with alters (Bearman and Parigi, 2004; Brashears,
014; Small, 2013). Finally, females often provide more interper-
onal support than males (Wellman and Wortley, 1990). In short,
t is clear that networks differ in a number of ways by sex.
Two broad classes of explanation have been advanced for
ex-based differences in networks: structuralist perspectives and
reference-based perspectives. Structuralist perspectives argue
hat network structure and composition are primarily determined
y the availability of others for association (e.g., Blau, 1977; Feld,
981; McPherson and Smith-Lovin, 1982, 1987; Moore, 1990;
unch et al., 1997). Preference-based perspectives argue that
ales and females have different networks because they prefer,
r select for, different types of alters and structures (e.g., Brashears,
008b; Eder and Hallinan, 1978; Feshbach and Sones, 1971; Ibarra,
992; Lewis et al., 2008). Research also suggests that individuals
refer to exhibit different behavior toward alters depending on the
lter’s sex (McDonald et al., 2009; McGuire, 2002).
Controlling for structural factors often reduces, but does not
liminate, the differences between male and female networks
e.g., Moore, 1990). Moreover, cross-national research reveals pat-
erns of male and female network difference similar to the U.S.
Bastani, 2007). As such, structural accounts are insufﬁcient. Pref-
rence based explanations help to compensate for the limitations
f structural explanations, but typically assume that opportuni-
ies for contact are roughly similar, which is rarely the case (e.g.,
cPherson and Smith-Lovin, 1982, 1987). Moreover, few studies
irectly assess preferences and instead infer them from real-
zed relationships. However, both structural and preference based
ccounts run afoul of a problematic assumption: that males and
emales understand networks and their features in the same way.
ndividuals respond to perceptions of the network rather than its
eality (e.g., Kilduff and Krackhardt, 2008, Ch. 3) and if males and
emales perceive networks differently, then they could develop
ery different networks even while preferring the same outcomes
nd enjoying the same opportunities. This represents a serious
versight given the growing literature showing that cognition is
ssential to social networks.
.2. Cognition, memory and social networks
There is growing evidence that cognition plays a key role in
ocial networks. Research using both human and animal models
as shown that brain structure is associated with network size
nd structure (Barton, 1996; Bickart et al., 2011; Dunbar, 1992,
993, 1995; Goncalves et al., 2011; Kudo and Dunbar, 2001; Meyer
t al., 2012; Sallet et al., 2011; Stiller and Dunbar, 2007; Zahn
t al., 2007). Likewise, human social networks have been shown
o resemble those of many non-human species, further conﬁrming
he roots of human sociability in our biological endowments (Faust
nd Skvoretz, 2002; Skvoretz and Faust, 2002). Social abilities
ncrease during early childhood as individuals learn to model the
ntentions of others (Karniol and Ross, 1979), and to manage tri-
dic relations (Hallinan and Kubitschek, 1988; Leinhardt, 1973;
chaefer et al., 2010, But see also Daniel et al., 2013), suggesting that
ocial networks depend on the maturation of critical brain regions.
oreover, recent studies (Janicik and Larrick, 2005; Simpson
t al., 2011a) have shown that memory for social structure taps atworks 44 (2016) 74–84 75
fundamentally different set of skills than does memory for non-
social stimuli.
Research also indicates that the manner in which social infor-
mation is processed inﬂuences learning speed and overall recall
success (For a review see Brashears and Quintane, 2015). De Soto
(1960) found that networks were learned more rapidly when
they were built from the expected type of relation and concluded
that his subjects possessed schemata (1960: 420), or pre-existing
frameworks for understanding information, that allowed them to
organize the learning experience and complete it more rapidly
(Bartlett, 1932; Neisser, 1967). Schemata are integral to memory
for many types of information (e.g., Brewer and Treyens, 1981;
Martin, 1993), and so their relevance to social domains is logi-
cal. Schemata pertaining to affective balance (Cartright and Harary,
1956) and triadic closure appear to play an especially signiﬁcant
role in aiding recall (Fischer, 1968; Freeman, 1992; Janicik and
Larrick, 2005; Picek et al., 1975; Sentis and Burnstein, 1979; Walker,
1976). Recent research by Brashears (2013) ﬁnds that schemata not
only accelerate the learning of social networks but also function
as “compression heuristics,” allowing larger numbers of relations
to be recalled more accurately. The types of mistakes made also
depended on the compression heuristics that were activated.
The preceding studies indicate that encoding (i.e., inserting
information into memory) and recalling (i.e., accessing information
from memory) networks relies on stable cognitive attributes and
strategies, but the quality of network recall also depends on tran-
sient qualities of cognition. For example, recognition of alters from a
list is compromised by negative moods (Hlebec and Ferligoj, 2001).
More central persons in a network tend to have more accurate per-
ceptions of its structure (Krackhardt, 1987, 1990), as do actors with
low structural power (e.g., Simpson and Borch, 2005), but network
perception can also be improved merely by priming respondents
with a sense of low power (Simpson et al., 2011a). These ﬁnal results
are important because sex roles can prime respondents in ways that
alter their cognitive performance and therefore, may also inﬂuence
the cognitive processing of social networks.
2.3. Sex and situational cognition
The notion that males and females think differently is so old
that the original citation was likely published on a clay tablet. Yet,
there is increasing evidence that sex-based differences in cogni-
tion and behavior are situational rather than durable. Neurological
evidence shows that the density of dendritic spines in the hip-
pocampus, which is implicated in learning, varies as a function of
sex, blood estrogen level, and stress condition (Shors et al., 2001).
In other words, the biological readiness of the brain to learn is
shaped by its context (i.e., exposure to stress and, if female, phase of
its menstrual cycle) as well as by an organism’s sex. Behaviorally,
Lightdale and Prentice (1994) showed that when sex roles were
deactivated females were equal to males, if not greater, in their
aggressive behavior. This indicates that rather than males being
inherently more aggressive than females, it is likely that females
limit their aggressiveness in order to conform to sex expectations
(see also Eagly and Steffen, 1986). Similarly, Anderson and Leaper
(1998) found that while males were more prone to intrusively inter-
rupt in conversation, these differences were substantially reduced
in dyads, relative to larger groups. This result is consistent with
a greater reliance on sex expectations in interactions that are less
tailored to speciﬁc individuals and their relationship. LaFrance et al.
(2003) found an international tendency for females to smile more
than males, but the extent of the difference nonetheless varies
by nation. They also found a greater female advantage in smiling
in situations characterized by social rather than task-related ten-
sion, and evidence that activation of sex norms directly increases
the disparity in male/female smiling. These results show that
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ultural expectations impact the rates of male/female smiling, and
hat females may  be more sensitive to social conﬂict than males.
The well-studied phenomenon of stereotype threat provides
nother example of situational cognition. Stereotypes are ideas
bout a category of individuals that are widely available, and
ccepted, in a given culture (Lippmann, 1922; Judd and Park,
993; Operario and Fiske, 2001). For example, females are often
iewed as less adept at mathematics than males (Shih et al., 1999;
pencer et al., 1999). Much like status characteristics, stereotypes
an impact the performance of the groups that they are applied
o (see Nguyen and Ryan, 2008), even if the group members do
ot agree with the stereotype themselves. However the individ-
al must be explicitly or implicitly (Greenwald and Banaji, 1995)
rimed on, or otherwise made aware of, their stereotyped status
r the stereotyped status of others (Aronson et al., 1999) while
erforming a salient task (Steele and Aronson, 1995; Shih et al.,
999). For example, a female who completes a math test in an envi-
onment that makes her sex salient will generally exhibit poorer
erformance relative to a female whose sex is not made salient
Steele, 1997). The phenomenon has also been observed outside the
ab, indicating that it is generalizable (Rothgerber and Wolsiefer,
013; Stricker and Ward, 2004). The mechanism linking activa-
ion of the stereotype to altered performance is somewhat unclear,
ut likely results either from unconscious conformation to expec-
ations (Kray et al., 2001; Wheeler and Petty, 2001) or the depletion
f cognitive resources produced by the awareness of the expecta-
ions, and the desire to defy them (Beilock et al., 2007; Schmader
nd Johns, 2003; Schmader et al., 2008). Moreover a parallel process
f “stereotype boost” has been observed, wherein priming individ-
als on a favorable stereotype results in improved performance on
tereotype relevant tasks (e.g., Shih et al., 2002, 2011). In either case,
ognition and behavior are situationally shaped by the salience of
ne’s sex.
Sex is one of the ﬁrst characteristics individuals note during
nteraction and, due to the roughly equal proportions of males and
emales in the population, it is activated frequently (Ridgeway and
orrell, 2004; Ridgeway and Smith-Lovin, 1999). It is therefore rea-
onable to expect that when forming and maintaining network
ies males and females are often aware of their sex, and should
e primed to behave in ways consistent with these expectations.
s a result, differences in male and female network cognition may
rimarily, or only, appear when sex is made salient.
. Hypotheses
In the previous sections, we reviewed the extant literature
howing that: (1) males and females have different networks, (2)
ognition, and especially the encoding and recall of network infor-
ation, can explain differences in networks, but there is a dearth of
ork linking cognition to differences in social networks between
ales and females, and (3) cognitive differences between males and
emales can be invoked, or increased, through priming sex. Based
n these premises, we propose that males and females differ in
he accuracy of their recall of social networks, and that these dif-
erences rely on, or are accentuated by, sex priming. We  further
ropose that the structure of the target network and the type of
elationships to be recalled will partially or fully explain differences
n male and female recall accuracy.
There is little existing research to argue for a greater (or lower)
ccuracy of recall (rather than just different) between males and
emales. Yet, what does exist inclines us toward greater accuracy
mong women as compared to men. Females have been found
o have larger networks than males (e.g., Moore, 1990), which
mplies that they have the cognitive ability to manage these larger
roups. Additionally, prior work indicates that network perceptiontworks 44 (2016) 74–84
is impacted by power and that individuals who are in low power
positions (Simpson and Borch, 2005), or perceive themselves as
having low power (Simpson et al., 2011a), have more accurate net-
work recall. Because female has the lower value for the sex diffuse
status characteristic (Ridgeway, 2001), females are likely to often be
in the low power position and thus may have better network recall
than males, or may have improved recall when they are primed on
their sex.
• Female-Sex Hypothesis: Females are more accurate at recalling
networks than are males.
• Female-Priming Hypothesis: Females who are primed on their
sex are more accurate at recalling networks than are females who
are not so primed.
While previous research indicates that triads are often used
as schemata for learning networks faster or more effectively (e.g.,
Brashears, 2013; Brashears and Quintane, 2015; Janicik and Larrick,
2005), females are less prone to complete triads than males
(Eder and Hallinan, 1978; Feshbach and Sones, 1971; Lewis et al.,
2008). This may  stem from differences in the types of games
played in childhood, with males forming large groups for team
sports and females forming dyads for imagination play. Regard-
less, the ﬁnding suggests that females may  be less practiced with
schemata implying, or relying upon, triadic closure than males.
This in turn suggests that females are more accurate at recall-
ing networks that are signiﬁcantly or primarily composed of open
triads. Alternatively, for females, priming on sex may  make non-
triadic, gender-linked schemata more cognitively available, and
improve recall of networks that contain many open triads.
• Triad-Sex Hypothesis: Females are more accurate at recalling
networks exhibiting open triads than are males.
• Triad-Priming Hypothesis: Females primed on their sex are
more accurate at recalling networks exhibiting open triads than
are females who are not so primed.
Previous research shows that relationship type can be a power-
ful schema for network recall (Brashears, 2013; Brewer and Yang,
1994). Females exhibit networks more centered on kin than males
(Marsden, 1987), and this tendency is often exacerbated by life
events that make male/female differences more salient, like the
birth of a child (Moore, 1990; Munch et al., 1997). Moreover,
research shows that oxytocin enhances perception of kin relations
among females, but not among males (Fischer-Shofty et al., 2013).
We might therefore expect that females are more adept at utilizing
kin schemas than males, and that females primed on their sex will
be more adept at using these schemas than females not so primed.
• Kin-Sex Hypothesis: Females are more accurate at recalling
networks composed of kin relations than males.
• Kin-Priming Hypothesis: Females primed on their sex are more
accurate at recalling networks composed of kin relations than are
females who  are not so primed.
4. Methods
4.1. Basic experimental design
Participants (235 female, 134 male) were recruited from among
the undergraduate population of a mid-sized northeastern univer-
sity in the United States using ﬂyers and other direct solicitations.
These participants were randomized into one of four experimental
conditions with a minimum of 89 and a maximum of 97 partici-
pants per condition. Drawing on the method described in Brashears
M.E. Brashears et al. / Social Ne
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bFig. 1. Reducible (panel a) and irreducible (panel b) network structures.
2013), all four conditions presented a vignette describing a net-
ork of relationships between ﬁfteen individuals (e.g., “Henry
s Alyssa’s brother. Henry is also Elizabeth’s son. . .”), and each
ignette included a structural reducibility manipulation and a cul-
ural schema strength manipulation. A network was  reducible if
t contained triadic closure1 (Fig. 1a), while it was  irreducible if
1 A closed triad occurs when three persons, A, B, and C, all have relationships with
ach  other. An open triad results when one or more of the possible relationships
etween A, B, and C do not exist.tworks 44 (2016) 74–84 77
it contained no closed triads (Fig. 1b). A network had a strong
cultural schema if relations were described using kin labels (e.g.,
parent/child, brother/sister), and it had a weak cultural schema
if the relations were described using non-kin recreational labels
(e.g., friend, group member). Spouses were considered to be kin
because they are ﬁctive kin, because they often share genetic rela-
tionships to shared children, and because they represent a durable
kin-like alliance. Females are hypothesized to be less sensitive to
triads than males (Triad-Sex & Triad-Priming Hypotheses), and
to be more sensitive to kin relations than males (Kin-Sex & Kin-
Priming Hypotheses), making these manipulations appropriate.
All vignettes contained two disconnected components (i.e., sub-
groups with no connections between them), and the strong and
weak schema conditions used different relationship types (e.g.,
spouse, friend, etc.). The same number of relationship types were
used in each vignette, the components did not vary in size by con-
dition, and both characters and ties were presented in the same
order in each vignette.
The vignettes in all conditions contained 15 nodes, but all
reducible condition vignettes contained 46 reciprocated directed
ties while all irreducible condition vignettes contained 26 recip-
rocated directed ties and no vignettes contained unreciprocated
ties. Because the number of nodes was constant in all vignettes and
the speciﬁed constraints were imposed (e.g., triadic closure), the
vignettes in the reducible and irreducible conditions were forced
to have unequal numbers of ties. The network size of 15 was chosen
using research on working memory capacity (Reisberg, 1997) with
the intention of stressing the participants; the number of individ-
uals depicted exceeds the capacity of working memory by roughly
a factor of two, and the potential number of relations (i.e., 210) is
more than an order of magnitude greater.
Participants began the presentation phase by sitting at a
prepared computer terminal and answering a series of simple
demographic questions. A randomly chosen vignette was  then pre-
sented as a paragraph of text and the participants were instructed to
commit it to memory. Participants had unlimited time to study the
vignette and were allowed to take notes, but knew that the notes
would be conﬁscated before the recall phase. The amount of time
spent studying the vignette was  measured without the participants’
knowledge. Once the participant ﬁnished studying the vignette,
they completed a word span exercise (Daneman and Carpenter,
1980) with the experimenter. This both cleared the sensory and
working memory stores, and provided a conventional measure of
working memory acuity.
In the recall phase participants checked a series of boxes to
indicate which characters had relations with each other and what
types of relationships they had. The presentation order for the
relationship presence items was  randomized by respondent to
prevent order effects. Finally, participants were compensated and
debriefed. Participants were told that the amount of compensation
(i.e., $6) was  contingent on their success at recalling the vignette,
but all participants who  completed the experiment were compen-
sated equally. The deception ensured that the participants were
motivated to recall the information accurately.
The experiment typically required forty minutes to complete,
and all participants completed it. Researchers were blind to respon-
dent condition during data collection and all procedures were
approved by the IRB.
4.2. Sex primes
The procedures described above are sufﬁcient for most of our
hypotheses, but cannot determine whether sex priming impacts
the encoding and recall of social networks. After completing the
demographic questions, but before presentation of one of the
vignettes described above, our subjects were exposed either to a
78 M.E. Brashears et al. / Social Networks 44 (2016) 74–84
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dent recalls less than the full number of ties, or recalls ties that
were not depicted. This measure also compensates for the unequal
number of ties by condition.Fig. 2. Overall experimental design with 
ex prime, or a control prime, taken from past research (i.e., Shih
t al., 1999). In the sex prime condition subjects were asked to give
heir opinions on living in same-sex versus mixed-sex housing. In
he control prime condition subjects were asked for their opin-
ons on the university phone and cable television services. The sex
rime has triggered stereotype effects (i.e., situationally impacted
ognition) in previous research (Shih et al., 1999), and is thus appro-
riate for our purposes. Subjects were randomized into either the
ex prime (n = 187) or the control prime (n = 195) condition before
eing exposed to the vignette, and thus in total the experiment is
 2 × 2 × 2 design. The ﬁnal design is illustrated in Fig. 2.
We  also included a manipulation check to conﬁrm that the
rimes had worked as expected. Following recall of the network
escribed in the vignette, the subject was asked to complete a series
f ten math problems drawn from practice materials for the Grad-
ate Record Examination (GRE). Subjects were informed that they
ad seven minutes to complete the problems and that their per-
ormance would be judged based on both the number of problems
ompleted and on their accuracy. If the subject had not completed
he problems by the end of seven minutes, the system automat-
cally advanced to the next stage. Given past research (e.g., Shih
t al., 1999; Steele, 1997), if sex primed females show a decline in
athematics performance then the manipulation was successful
nd its effects were felt throughout the network encoding, word
pan, and recall phases. We  conﬁrm the reducibility and schema
trength manipulations by reproducing the effects in Brashears
2013); without distinguishing by sex or priming, a strong schema
hould exert a negative effect, reducibility a positive effect, and
heir interaction should be positive. The results of both checks arell observations and mean accuracy levels.
favorable (analyses omitted to save space), indicating that females
primed on their sex exhibit signiﬁcantly poorer math performance
than non-primed females, and that there is no signiﬁcant differ-
ence between primed and non-primed males. This conﬁrms both
that the sex prime was  effective, and that its inﬂuence persisted
throughout the study, word span, and recall phases. We  can there-
fore reasonably expect to observe the effects of sex activation on
network recall, if such effects exist. We  also successfully repro-
duced the effects reported in Brashears, 2013, and therefore can
be sure that the reducibility and schema strength manipulations
are operating as expected.
4.3. Measures
To test our hypotheses it is necessary that we be able to quantify
the quality of network recall. We  use accuracy,2 computed by multi-
plying participant precision3 (i.e., correctly recalled ties divided by
all recalled ties) by participant coverage (i.e., correctly recalled ties
divided by all depicted ties), as our outcome variable. This measure
equals one when the participant recalls all the ties depicted in the
vignette, and only those ties, and is less than one when the respon-2 This measure is identical to the measure called “performance” in Brashears
(2013).
3 This measure is identical to the measure called “accuracy” in Brashears (2013).
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Several controls were also included. Word span is the partic-
pant’s score on the working memory exercise and provides a
onventional measure of general memory acuity, independent of
he experimental task. Time spent is the number of seconds partic-
pants devoted to learning the vignettes. Because the respondents
ould spend as much time as desired, it is necessary to adjust for
he effort they expended in learning the target networks. Respon-
ents spent a mean of 538 s (i.e., roughly nine minutes) learning
he network, with a standard deviation of 339 s (i.e., approximately
ix minutes).
. Results
We  begin by examining the differences between males and
emales. These models allow us to test our Triad-Sex, Kin-Sex,
nd Female-Sex hypotheses. We  then estimate models contrasting
ex-primed females with non-primed females, and sex-primed
ales with non-primed males. These models allow us to test our
riad-Priming, Kin-Priming, and Sex-Priming hypotheses. We then
stimate an additional three models to examine whether the differ-
nces we detect can be attributed to variation in mean personality
raits using the ﬁve-factor personality model. Finally, we discuss
he results of exponential random-graph modeling to identify dif-
erences in male/female cognitive ﬂexibility.
.1. Males vs. females
We  examine whether males and females differ in their skill at
ncoding and recalling social information and whether these differ-
nces are associated with either reducibility (i.e., triadic closure) or
chema strength (i.e., kin vs. non-kin). All results comparing males
irectly to females are available in Table 1.
The results presented in Model 1 (Table 1) indicate that
emales appear to be signiﬁcantly more accurate than males
0.077, p < 0.007), consistent with the Female-Sex Hypothesis.
hese results suggest that females are noticeably more accurate
n recalling network information than males, even after control-
ing for the availability of compression heuristics, working memory
apacity, and the amount of time spent studying the target network.
Model 2 includes interactions between female sex and each of
he compression heuristic variables. Females continue to exhibit
uperior accuracy relative to males (0.111, p < 0.040), but none
f the interactions are signiﬁcant. Given the lack of signiﬁcant
nteractions, we estimate a new model (Model 3) that eliminates
he three-way interaction between female sex, reducibility, and
chema strength, but retains all other effects. Female sex contin-
es to exert a positive effect on recall accuracy (0.101, p < 0.034),
ut its interactions with both reducibility and schema strength
emain non-signiﬁcant. This indicates that the female advantage
n network recall is not related to relative skill with either of these
euristics, and fails to support the Triad-Sex and Kin-Sex hypothe-
es.
Finally, we estimated a model identical to Model 1, but includ-
ng an interaction effect between female sex and time spent. The
esults (Model 4) are consistent with earlier models, but roughly
ouble the main effect of female sex (0.196, p < 0.001). Intriguingly,
he model also indicates that females beneﬁt less from additional
ime spent studying the vignette than do males (−0.0002, p < 0.009).
n other words, these results indicate that females are not only
ore accurate than males at encoding and recalling social informa-
ion, but that they do so while beneﬁting less from study time. This
urther supports a conclusion that females are more efﬁcient than
ales at processing social information, and supports the Female-
ex hypothesis, while failing to support the Triad-Sex or Kin-Sex
ypotheses.tworks 44 (2016) 74–84 79
5.2. Sex prime vs. Control prime
We next estimate a series of six models: the ﬁrst three contrast
sex primed females with control primed females, while the second
three contrast sex primed males with control primed males. All
priming results are available in Table 2.
Beginning with females, Model 5 shows that the main effect of
sex priming is non-signiﬁcant, suggesting that recall accuracy is not
inﬂuenced by making one’s sex salient. The time spent studying the
vignette continues to improve recall accuracy (0.0005, p < 0.001)
and respondent word span score has no signiﬁcant effect. This
implies that working memory capacity is not strongly related to
female social network recall performance.
Model 6 adds interactions between the sex prime and the com-
pression heuristics. The sex prime variable remains non-signiﬁcant
and none of its interactions with compression heuristics attain sig-
niﬁcance. We  estimate a third model (i.e., Model 7) that drops
the non-signiﬁcant three-way interaction between sex priming,
reducibility, and schema strength. However, the results are consis-
tent with the previous two  models: the main effect of sex priming,
as well as its interactions with compression heuristics, are non-
signiﬁcant.
Moving on to males, in Model 8 the main effect of sex prim-
ing is non-signiﬁcant, indicating that males who  are made aware
of their sex are no better at encoding and recalling social networks
than males who are not so aware. However, both word span (0.036,
p < 0.049) and time spent (0.0007, p < 0.001) exert a positive inﬂu-
ence on recall accuracy.
Model 9 adds interactions between the sex prime and the com-
pression heuristics. As before, the main effect of the sex prime is
non-signiﬁcant, as are its interactions with the compression heuris-
tics. We  estimate a ﬁnal model (i.e., Model 10) that eliminates
the non-signiﬁcant three-way interaction between sex priming,
reducibility, and schema strength. However, as with females, the
results are consistent with previous models: sex priming, as well
as its remaining interactions, have no signiﬁcant impact on male
recall accuracy.
In total, the results of these six models fail to support the
Triad-Priming, Kin-Priming, or Female-Priming Hypotheses. Nei-
ther males nor females are impacted directly by making their sex
salient, and salience does not appear to make triadic or kin-based
compression heuristics more or less available for use. This strongly
suggests that the female advantage in network recall identiﬁed pre-
viously is not situational in nature. Below we  consider two alternate
explanations for this effect: personality characteristics and differ-
ences in cognitive ﬂexibility.
5.3. Sex, memory and personality
Females enjoy a recall advantage relative to males, but ben-
eﬁt less from study time than do males, and do not differ from
males in the processing of triadic or kin-based schemata. So why
is female network recall more accurate than male recall? Previ-
ous research (e.g., Casciaro, 1998; Emery, 2012; Kalish and Robins,
2006; Klein et al., 2004; Mehra et al., 2001) has identiﬁed associa-
tions between personality traits, network perception, and network
structure. Moreover, males and females differ systematically in
their typical personality traits (Costa et al., 2001; Weisberg et al.,
2011). Therefore, differences in male and female recall success
might disappear once personality is controlled.
To explore this issue we turn to data on the “Big Five” personal-
ity traits: Neuroticism, Extraversion, Openness, Agreeableness, and
Conscientiousness (Digman, 1990; John et al., 2008). The Big Five
have been shown to inﬂuence network structure and perception
(Casciaro, 1998; Emery, 2012; Kalish and Robins, 2006; Klein et al.,
2004), and are therefore appropriate for our purposes. Participants
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Table 1
Regression models comparing male recall performance to female recall performance.
Model number: 1 2 3 4
Group:  All All All All
Reducible 0.186*** 0.209** 0.195*** 0.196***
(0.038) (0.061) (0.051) (0.037)
Strong  Schema −0.067∼ −0.0298 −0.044 −0.068∼
(0.037) (0.062) (0.051) (0.037)
Reducible * Strong 0.160** 0.132 0.161** 0.153**
(0.054) (0.089) (0.054) (0.053)
Female * Reducible −0.036 −0.014
(0.078) (0.055)
Female * Strong −0.058 −0.036
(0.077) (0.056)
Female * Reducible * Strong 0.046
(0.111)
Word Span 0.029* 0.0298* 0.030* 0.029*
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Time  Spent 0.0005*** 0.0005*** 0.0005*** 0.0007***
(0.00004) (0.00004) (0.00004) (0.00007)
Female 0.077** 0.111* 0.101* 0.196***
(0.028) (0.054) (0.047) (0.053)
Sex  Prime −0.028 −0.027 −0.028 −0.038
(0.026) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027)
Female * Time Spent −0.0002**
(0.00009)
Constant 0.019 −0.005 0.002 −0.058
(0.051) (0.060) (0.058) (0.058)
R2 0.46 0.461 0.461 0.471
N=  368 368 368 368
i
a
c
w
e
w
T
T
R* p < 0.05, ∼p < 0.05 one-tailed.
** p < 0.01.
*** p < 0.001.
n our study completed a brief Big Five personality trait inventory
dopted from previous research (Goldberg, 1992). This inventory
onsisted of a series of twenty-ﬁve (ﬁve per trait) Likert scale items
ith item sequence randomized by participant to prevent order
ffects.We estimated three models that duplicate Model 4 (Table 1), but
ith control variables added for the “Big Five” personality traits.
he ﬁrst model includes the controls for the Big Five traits for all
able 2
egression models estimating the effect of sex priming on male and female recall perform
Model number: 5 6 
Group: Females Females 
Reducible 0.187*** 0.223**
(0.050) (0.072) 
Strong Schema −0.082∼ −0.065 
(0.049) (0.068) 
Reducible * Strong 0.158* 0.172∼ 
(0.071) (0.100) 
Sex  Prime * Reducible −0.076 
(0.099) 
Sex  Prime * Strong −0.04 
(0.097) 
Sex  Prime * Reducible * Strong −0.025 
(0.1395) 
Word  Span 0.025 0.024 
(0.018) (0.018) 
Time  Spent 0.0005*** 0.0005***
(0.00005) (0.00005) 
Sex  Prime −0.034 0.031 
(0.035) (0.068) 
Constant 0.157* 0.127 
(0.064) (0.069) 
R2 0.414 0.420 
N=  235 235 
* p < 0.05, ∼p < 0.05 one-tailed.
** p < 0.01.
*** p < 0.001.respondents, the second does so for females only, and the third
for males only. If the female recall advantage is due to differences
in personality between males and females, then inclusion of these
variables should render the female coefﬁcient, the female inter-
action with time spent, or both, non-signiﬁcant. The single sex
models, in contrast, allow us to conﬁrm that a sex priming effect is
not being obscured by personality effects. All models are given in
Table 3.
ance.
7 8 9 10
Females Males Males Males
0.229*** 0.210*** 0.247** 0.205**
(0.061) (0.055) (0.081) (0.0698)
−0.056 −0.041 −0.006 −0.049
(0.059) (0.056) (0.082) (0.070)
0.159* 0.152∼ 0.063 0.152∼
(0.071) (0.081) (0.118) (0.082)
−0.089 −0.071 0.008
(0.069) (0.111) (0.081)
−0.052 −0.068 0.015
(0.069) (0.113) (0.082)
0.169
(0.161)
0.024 0.036* 0.036∼ 0.036∼
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018)
0.0005*** 0.0007*** 0.0007*** 0.0007***
(0.00005) (0.00007) (0.00007) (0.00007)
0.036 −0.042 −0.013 −0.053
(0.059) (0.041) (0.079) (0.069)
0.125 −0.095 −0.111 −0.087
(0.067) (0.072) (0.084) (0.082)
0.42 0.550 0.554 0.550
235 133 133 133
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Table  3
Regression models evaluating the effect of the ﬁve-factor personality model on recall
performance.
Model number: 11 12 13
Group: All Females Males
Reducible 0.206*** 0.199*** 0.228***
(0.038) (0.051) (0.057)
Strong Schema −0.073* −0.093∼ −0.038
(0.037) (0.049) (0.056)
Reducible * Strong 0.157** 0.164* 0.153∼
(0.053) (0.071) (0.081)
Word Span 0.032* 0.027 0.042*
(0.013) (0.018) (0.018)
Time Spent 0.0007*** 0.0005*** 0.0007***
(0.00007) (0.00005) (0.00007)
Female 0.194***
(0.053)
Sex Prime −0.034 −0.029 −0.041
(0.027) (0.035) (0.041)
Female * Time Spent −0.0002*
(0.00009)
Neuroticism −0.020 −0.026 −0.013
(0.012) (0.016) (0.0196)
Extraversion −0.031* −0.018 −0.057*
(0.016) (0.020) (0.025)
Openness −0.008 −0.014 0.0008
(0.018) (0.025) (0.025)
Agreeableness 0.012 −0.0096 0.043
(0.020) (0.027) (0.029)
Conscientiousness −0.003 0.0004 −0.005
(0.015) (0.020) (0.024)
Constant 0.127 0.429* −0.007
(0.129) (0.173) (0.195)
R2 0.482 0.428 0.572
N=  367 234 133
*
e
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Qp < 0.05, ∼p < 0.05 one-tailed.
** p < 0.01.
*** p < 0.001.
Examination of Model 11 reveals that of the Big Five traits, only
xtraversion exerts a signiﬁcant effect, but this effect is negative
−0.031, p < 0.048), which runs counter to what we and previous
esearch (e.g., Casciaro, 1998) might expect. Most critically, both
he main effect of female sex (0.194, p < 0.001) and its interaction
ith time spent (−0.0002, p < 0.016) remain signiﬁcant and of the
ame direction and magnitude as in Model 4 (Table 1), while the
ain effect of the sex prime manipulation remains non-signiﬁcant.
n other words, controlling for personality traits has no effect what-
oever on the apparent female advantage in network recall.
The female-only results (Model 12) are consistent with this
verall conclusion; in this case, none of the Big Five traits are signif-
cant, but neither is the main effect of the sex prime manipulation.
s such, it appears to be highly unlikely that any of the Big Five
ersonality traits account for the lack of effect from the sex prime
or females.
Lastly, the results for males-only (Model 13) are also consis-
ent with previous ﬁndings; of the Big Five traits, only extraversion
xhibits a signiﬁcant effect (−0.057, p < 0.023), but this effect is
egative. Finally, the main effect of the sex prime remains non-
igniﬁcant for males.
Given the above results, it appears to be highly unlikely that the
emale advantage in network recall relative to males, or the lack of
ffect exerted by the sex prime, can be attributed to differences in
ersonality as captured by the Big Five.
.4. Cognitive ﬂexibilityFinally, we investigated whether males and females display dif-
erent levels of cognitive ﬂexibility. Recent research (Brashears and
uintane, 2015) has shown that when asked to remember a socialtworks 44 (2016) 74–84 81
network, respondents were able to use heuristics corresponding to
different microstructural features (i.e., triads and groups) depend-
ing on the information contained in the network. The female recall
advantage identiﬁed previously may therefore result from greater
skill at identifying and employing the most appropriate heuristic
for a given network.
We explored this possibility empirically using Exponential Ran-
dom Graph Models (ERGMs – Lusher et al., 2013) to capture the
micro-level structures that characterize the recalled networks.
More speciﬁcally, our models enable us to detect consistent tenden-
cies toward speciﬁc types of recall errors. These consistent errors
allow us to infer whether there is a systematic tendency to use
dyads, triads or groups as a primary heuristic to encode the net-
work in memory and, in turn, to determine if this tendency varies
by sex.
We carried out two different analyses of cognitive ﬂexibility.
First, we  used the statnet package in R (Handcock et al., 2014)
to model each respondent’s network, using terms for dyad, triad
and group encoding, and while controlling for the network to be
recalled. We  then counted the number of signiﬁcant edges, triads
or group parameters across the models, distinguishing by condi-
tion (i.e., Male/Female, Primed/Non Primed) to determine if males
and females used different heuristics to recall the networks. Our
results (omitted to save space) show no evidence for the use of
different recall heuristics between males and females or between
primed and non-primed respondents. As such, the female network
recall advantage does not appear to derive from more ﬂexible or
appropriate use of heuristics.
Second, we  created a series of consensus networks for each
condition in the manner of Brashears (2013), Krackhardt (1987),
and Brashears and Quintane (2015). In each network, ties are con-
sidered to exist if a speciﬁed percentage (i.e., consensus level)
or more of the respondents agreed that it existed. For exam-
ple, for a tie to exist in a 5% consensus network, at least 5% of
respondents need to have mentioned it in their answers. Because
recall accuracy is, in general, quite high these consensus networks
provide a more effective way  to capture consistent error types
and allow us to examine the networks at different levels of sen-
sitivity. Because consensus networks above 25% do not have ties
that deviate from the network to be recalled (they have missing
ties, but no additional ties), we  generated ﬁve consensus networks
(5%, 10%, 15%, 20% and 25%) for each combination of conditions
(i.e., Reducible/Irreducible × Male/Female × Sex/Null Prime). We
obtained a total of 40 networks and estimated an ERG model in
PNet (Wang et al., 2006) for each network using terms that rep-
resent dyads, triads and group heuristics while controlling for the
network to be remembered. As above, the pattern of signiﬁcance
of the ERGMs failed to reveal any speciﬁc difference between male
and female, between primed female and non-primed females and
between primed males and non-primed males regarding their use
of speciﬁc heuristics to recall the target network. Thus, once again,
we do not identify any evidence that the female recall advantage is
derived from differences in cognitive ﬂexibility.
6. Discussion
Males and females typically inhabit different networks, but the
reasons for this are unclear. One possibility is that males and
females experience different opportunities and constraints when
building and maintaining networks, leading to their different end
conﬁgurations. Alternatively, males and females may  pursue differ-
ent networks because they prefer different conﬁgurations. In this
paper, we  exposed a third line of explanation, and suggested that
these outcomes result in part from different fundamental under-
standings of how the network is structured.
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Our primary ﬁnding is that females exhibit superior recall of
ocial networks relative to males, and this advantage is quite sub-
tantial. The results from Model 4 (Table 1) indicate that, if recall
ccuracy were rated from 0% to 100%, being female is sufﬁcient to
mprove one’s score by almost twenty percentage points. More-
ver, while both males and females beneﬁt from studying the
etwork for longer periods of time, females beneﬁt less than males.
his suggests that females encode and recall social information
ore efﬁciently than do males. We  have therefore uncovered an
dditional explanation for the observed differences in male and
emale networks: females typically have larger networks than
ales in part because they are able to cognitively manage these
etworks more reliably. While this certainly does not indicate that
tructural availability and preferences are irrelevant to network
omposition, it does strongly suggest that at least some of the differ-
nces between males and females derive from cognition. We  have
herefore provided evidence for a third, and previously unstudied,
xplanation for sex differences in social networks.
Previous research suggests that females should be more adept at
anaging networks with many open triads, and more skilled with
etworks composed of kin. However, our models failed to iden-
ify any differences between males and females in recall success
ased on these attributes. Therefore, while females do appear to
ecall networks more efﬁciently than males, this advantage does
ot stem from their skill (or lack thereof) with the tested compres-
ion heuristics.
Because sex is frequently activated in, and relevant to, inter-
ction, it is reasonable to ask whether priming sex could impact
etwork encoding and recall. Our results indicate unequivocally
hat while our sex prime was effective, it had no effect on the recall
f social network information. This suggests that the female recall
dvantage does not stem from cultural expectations that females
re superior at this task, or other forms of situational cognition
irectly determined by sex.
Personality traits are associated with network perception and
etwork structure, and females and males systematically differ
n their typical personality traits, so the female network recall
dvantage could simply be the result of different typical per-
onalities. However, even when we controlled for the Big Five
ersonality traits, we continued to observe a signiﬁcant associa-
ion between female sex and network recall. Moreover, the smaller
eneﬁt females reap from study time is unchanged.
Finally, previous research has demonstrated that humans are
ble to ﬂexibly adopt the most appropriate encoding method for a
iven network. We  therefore used ERG models to determine if the
ifferences between males and females were rooted in preferences
or different microstructures. However we identiﬁed no signiﬁcant
ifferences in the microstructures selected by males and females.
In summary, we ﬁnd that females are markedly superior to
ales in recalling social network information and that this superi-
rity cannot be accounted for using priming effects, differences in
he use of compression heuristics, working memory capacity, per-
onality traits, or cognitive ﬂexibility. Somewhat reluctantly, we
re forced to suggest that this may  reﬂect an underlying neuro-
ogical difference between the sexes. There is a growing awareness
hat social science must take biology into account (e.g., Freese et al.,
003; Hopcroft, 2005, 2006; Yamagishi et al., 2003) and we agree
hat biological and neurological explanations for social phenomena
hould receive more attention (e.g., Todorov et al., 2011). Never-
heless, it seems more likely to us that circumstances shape males
nd females such that females develop a relatively greater abil-
ty to encode and recall social networks. In general, psychological
esearch on gender difference is more consistent with overall sim-
larities than distinctiveness (see Hyde, 2005, 2014; Joel et al.,
014). Moreover, neurological research shows that mean differ-
nces in brain structure between the sexes are smaller than thetworks 44 (2016) 74–84
variations within-sex (Joel, 2012). Previous research showing that
low power actors have superior network knowledge (Simpson and
Borch, 2005; Simpson et al., 2011a) is consistent with, and may
explain, our results without the need to assume fundamental dif-
ferences between males and females, and this possibility is worthy
of further study.
The female advantage in network recall suggests that the differ-
ences in male and female networks may  be partially determined
by cognition. At a minimum, the female superiority in network
recall could allow them to cognitively manage larger networks than
males, and therefore in times of need they should often have deeper
reserves of social capital to draw upon. Similarly, females may  be
better able to sustain the cognitive demands imposed by bridg-
ing positions in a network (e.g., Burt, 1992, 2002), and thus may
be more effective brokers than males, though a lack of legitimacy
in many organizations may  make it difﬁcult to capitalize on this
advantage (Burt, 1998). However, while research shows that indi-
vidual low power actors can beneﬁt from their superior network
knowledge, possession of equally good network knowledge by all
low power actors tends to produce negative outcomes (Simpson
et al., 2011b). The improved knowledge allows all low power
actors to recognize and attempt to take advantage of opportunities,
thereby increasing the competition between them. Additionally,
more efﬁcient encoding and recall of social networks does not auto-
matically result in superior network knowledge or the ability to
translate awareness into action. Future research will be necessary
in order to fully understand the connections between the female
recall advantage and realized network structure.
7. Conclusion
We  began by asking how sex impacts network recall. Our results
indicate that females are superior at recalling social networks
relative to males, supporting our argument that sex differences
in realized networks may  derive from cognitive, rather than
preference or structural, variability. Moreover, the female recall
advantage does not derive from differences in compression heuris-
tic use, working memory, sex priming, personality, or cognitive
ﬂexibility. To our knowledge, this paper is the ﬁrst to demonstrate
this effect and it is an important start to a new avenue of research.
Future efforts should cluster in two key areas. Researchers
should endeavor to determine why  females are superior to males
in recalling social networks. One obvious possibility is that females
are often in lower power positions, and lower power is associ-
ated with improved network awareness. Alternatively, because
women often direct different types of ties to different types
of alters so as to balance homophily with instrumental beneﬁt
(e.g., Burt, 1998; Ibarra, 1992, 1995), it may  be that women are
more practiced with understanding and encoding complex net-
work structures than are men. More generally, it may  well be
that whenever individuals must divide their ties across multiple
semi-overlapping groups they develop superior network recall.
Additionally, future research should attempt to identify the spe-
ciﬁc consequences of superior network recall. Like the Cassandra
of Greek mythology, who  could see the future but not avert it,
females may  often be able to perceive their social environment
more accurately, without necessarily being able to derive ben-
eﬁt. However, even if they cannot beneﬁt, a greater ability to
recall networks may  help to explain network structure at a large
scale.
Our initial results are clear and fascinating. Females are substan-
tially better at encoding and recalling social networks, even when
controlling, both experimentally and statistically, for a wide variety
of other factors. Uncovering the reasons why  can only add both to
our knowledge of social networks and to our understanding of sex.
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